

THE AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS:
A PRELUDE TO AFRICAN MILITARY
HIGH COMMAND

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By

Prof. B.I.C Ijomah
University of Nigeria,
Nsukka.

“..... We should aim at the establishment of a unified military and defence strategy. I do not see much virtue or wisdom in our separate efforts to build up or maintain vast military forces for self-defence which, in any case, would be ineffective in any major attack upon our separate states.”

Kwame Nkrumah (1963: 219)

In 1963, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah outlined three major reasons why “Africa must unite.”¹ The first was the urgent need for unified economic planning, the second was the need for a unified military and defence strategy and the third which is consequent upon the first two was the need for a unified foreign policy and diplomacy.

The pious expectations of the Organization of African Unity that it would, among other things, foster unity and solidarity of African States through

- (4) political and diplomatic co-operation;
- (5) economic co-operation, including transport and communication;
- (6) educational and cultural co-operation;
- (7) health, sanitation, and nutritional co-operation;
- (8) scientific and technical co-operation and

1. Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, London; Heineman, 1963

(9) co-operation for defence and security,”²

would, in my opinion, not lead to lasting unity. At best it would elevate the O.A.U. to the status of a miniature United Nations where motions and resolutions are passed but nothing concrete is achieved. This is not to deny the fact that co-operation at different levels could create a sense of unity. But mere consciousness of the need for Unity is not enough. What Africa needs is functional Unity which would lead to integration on social, economic, political and military levels.

Obviously, the O.A.U. does not anticipate any kind of unity as proposed by the late Kwame Nkrumah in 1963. But the trend in Africa forces one to speculate that as the champions of violence displace the civilian members of the O.A.U., the rationale for a unified military strategy would become imperative. For many soldiers, power is now a source of wealth and if a unification of economic planning is a desideratum, the powers that usher in the planning cannot frown at its unification even if it is imposed.

Lasswell's Garrison-State hypothesis³ contends that the arena of world politics is moving towards domination of specialists on violence. Not only have many African countries moved in this direction but it is my contention that this movement is bound to gather momentum and become more centripetal. Table 1 shows the various military interventions. The analysis of variance for table 2 indicates that F is not significant at 0.5 level with 3 and 37 degrees of Freedom.

Even when randomized in table 3, the F calculated is 1.58 which also is not significant at .05 level with 1 and 37 degrees of freedom. One then confirms the hypothesis that there is no difference among the African countries in terms of military intervention. As pointed out (Ijomah, 1972) Military Intervention is becoming as African phenomenon. The present incursions into the Ethiopian dynasty which has finally striped the Lion of Judah of practically all his imperial powers must have taken the world by surprise. The Emperor could not read the had-writing on the walls to know that his over-throw was only a matter of time.

2. Zdenek Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter, London; C. Hurst & Company, 1969, p. 33.

3. Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today" in Huntington (ed.) Changing Patterns of Military Politics, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962, pp. 1 – 68

With due regard for the African liberation struggles in territories occupied by Portugal, the granting of independence to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique should be watched carefully. A conservative military leader is apt to become radical when faced with military realities in other African countries. Following Lasswell, one contends that the arena of African politics is dominated by specialists in violence. This does not in any sense imbue the military with any greater sense of nationalism, or more sincere dedication to national issues. In fact the Dahomean experience as well as the experience in many other African countries shows that uppermost in the motivating indices is personal ambition to power and wealth among the military leaders. Of course this ambition is often hidden by avowed love of the fatherland. But when the architects of the military takeover fail to share national 'cakes' equitably, there generally follows a coup of consolidation. This comes about when members of the core group that planned the first intervention accuse the military leaders of falling to live up to their expectations. The Algerian case and the rise of Boumedienne is typical. Another example is the case of Captain Michael Micombero who systematically overthrew King Ntare V of Burundi on 28th November, 1966.

THE RATIONALE FOR AFRICAN MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

As African countries drift to military rule, and military rulers become politicized and civilianized, the capacity of the military to protect the country in international encounters wanes in proportion to the growth of the military significance in domestic issues. With this may be compounded the comparatively small sizes of the armed forces of the various African countries. Nkrumah's argument that the military might of any individual African State is so insignificant that it would be ineffective in any major attack upon it is worth a critical examination. With the exception of Egypt with defence budget of \$480 million dollars, and Nigeria with \$326 million dollars defence budget, no other African country comes close enough to South Africa in terms of the emphasis placed on military preparedness. The Egyptian situation is understandable because of the

continued Arab- Israeli relationship. The excessively high spending on the Nigeria Armed Forces appears unrealistic in view of the peaceful atmosphere after the civil war. Most of the amount is spent on salaries and non-defensive structures. South Africa's Armed Forces total 129,400, with a military defence budget of \$370 million dollars. In addition, South Africa spends more than 3.57 million dollars on secret services. South Africa is less dependent on foreign aid for its manufacture of tanks, armoured cars and missiles of limited ranges. The proportion of South Africa's defence budget to the total National budget is .0998, while the combined defence budget of the 39 independent Africa countries considered here is 1,389.64 million dollars, which is .085 of the combined national budgets (see table 4).

The vulnerability of African countries is more accentuated by very poor intra-continental communications system, and the over exposure of defenceless African countries to South Africa and Rhodesia. During the Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka in September, 1971, the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama disclosed that the reluctance of Botswana to play an active and prominent role in the struggle for the establishment of majority rule throughout Southern Africa was due to their particularly exposed position and the severe limitations this imposed on his country.⁴

Even in less exposed countries like in Nigeria, the politicization and civilianization of the military have brought in their wake, a decline in the military virtues of the soldiers, and the incursion of corruption into military ethos. This corruption and the lust for money, power, wealth and privilege, have made the loyalties of the soldiers so conditional and unpredictable, and the life span of any government depends in Rapoport's views, on private ambitions of soldiers who are "rarely restrained by a sense of public morality."⁵ Rapoport contends that in the event of the unpredictability of such a praetorian regime, only strong personalities can secure momentary stability, but they rarely produce the institutions to confirm on appropriate successors.

(4) Colin Legume (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record 1970 – 71
London; Rex Collings, 1971, p. 8472.

(5) David C. Rapoport, "A Comparative Theory of Military and Political Types," in Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), Changing Patterns of Military Politics Page 4 of 34
Glencoe: The Free of Glencoe, Inc., 1961, p. 73

A cursory survey of African countries reveals such personalities as General Yakubu Gowon, President Julius Nyerere, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, whose momentary stability has just, ended, leaving Ethiopians to grope for impersonalized structures on which to found their country's stability. There is Qadhafi of Lybia, President Idi Amin of Uganda and President Sese Seko of Zaire. How stable these countries really are is questionable with coups dangling teasingly before them! It is this uncertainty, and the possibility of overthrow any moment which have created the Switzerland racket, where the nations' wealth is spirited away to foreign banks, denuding the countries of development capitals; because African countries are ruled by corrupt oligarchies, domestic policies are ineffective. The ineffectiveness of even the well-intentioned policies helps to make the conditions of the poor masses even more pitiable to excite the sympathy of ambitious military officers who become 'the most fruitful source of political intrigue...'⁶

It is thus my contention, that as long as the African Armed Forces continue to be interested in domestic politics, its preparedness for any foreign encounter will be limited. While the ruling oligarchies scheme to retain the powers they have grabbed from their predecessors, power gamblers spend sleepless nights scheming to discredit the disreputable rich and to wrest powers from them. Thus, domestic instability becomes self-generating, and needs external sedative to usher in domestic and internal stability.

This external sedative will depend on the establishment of a continental military command that can step into any African country to ensure that peace and orderly development are not disrupted by power –hungry individuals. This is incapable of leading to continental tyranny as such country would contribute forces, and send representatives to the Command Council. The Presidents of the various countries would become regional governors, and constitute the continental government, bringing the military squarely under the rule of a continental executive.

It would be argued that at present, there is no unifying event in Africa to justify the call for the African High Command. The goals which the organization of African Unity has set for itself include, among other things:

the promotion of unity and solidarity of the African States; the search for better life through the co-operation of African States; the defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity of African State; and perhaps, the most vocal of the objectives is the eradication of all forms of colonialism in Africa, an objective which certainly cannot be achieved in South African and Rhodesia unless Apartheid is met with force.

The cases of Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique must be seen as different from those of Rhodesia and South Africa. In the latter cases, Britain has shied of possible confrontation with the racists. Where as in the cases of Portuguese colonies, the internal disequilibrium in Portugal itself augurs well for the freedom fighters in Africa.

It would also be wrong to believe that the imminent independence of Portuguese African colonies has been mainly influenced by the persuasions and sanctions of members of the Organization of African Unity. If anything, it was the military and other physical aids to the freedom fighters, which made it possible to shatter the hopes of Portugal ever winning her colonial wars. Frustrated by the indomitable courage of the Africans, Portugal was forced to embark on a programme of granting independence.

South Africa has no allegiance to any colonial master, nor does Southern Rhodesia take Britain seriously. In the absence of external pressure from their former colonies, it appears to me that the only pressure that would succeed is physical (not moral pressure from independent African countries).

Organski (1959) contends that any potential aggressor can only be quietened when confronted by equal amount of force or power. The combined military strength of African countries can overwhelm. South African and Southern Rhodesia. There is no doubt that the military forces of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are increasing. While countries like Swaziland, Zambia, and

other mushroom countries cannot contemplate providing a force or forces that can counterbalance those of South Africa. It thus appears plausible to advocate a unification of African Armed Forces in order to force the racist regimes to make some concession. When the Africa Military High Command can pose a reasonable threat to apartheid, possible war may be averted if South Africa and Rhodesia make concessions in consideration of the growing strength of the combined African forces.

Only a united military strength of African countries can provide sufficient force to counterbalance the strength of South African and Rhodesia. By advocating a united military force, I am asking for contributions from independent military units. I am piously hoping that a continuation of military rules in Africa will create a forum for the development of an ideology to which African Military Leaders would be oriented. This ideological orientation will provide the glue that will hold the countries' armies together such that in the event of a possible confrontation, it would be between African Military Command versus the racists.

It is further proposed that by the time this ideological orientation becomes firmly rooted, the black people in Southern Rhodesia and South African would have been sufficiently disenchanted with their rulers that internal dissension would be rife.

It is also proposed that the probability that the African Military Leader will endorse an establishment of African Military Command depends on the intensity of their identification with the Organization of African Unity and the intensity of their shared faith that the liberation of African colonies from the clutches of colonial exploitation is a desired goal.

But one inherent danger which might frustrate efforts to establish a continental armed forces should be pointed out. The continued politicization of the military men, their vulnerability to corrupt practices, and the assimilation of the 'new rich' within the ruling stratum may tend to perpetuate localized interests in independent African nations and preclude the growth of ideological unity

which is indispensable for the growth of altruism in Africa. Another possible danger is Africa's reliance on foreign aid. This will be discussed later.

Nevertheless, the prevalence of military interventions as shown in table 1 shows the linear movement of all African countries towards the domination of military elites. The recent incursions into the Ethiopian monarchy shows the fragility of civilian rule in a 'garrisoned' continent. The obvious trend is that as soon as African Military elites develop a unified ideology or sharpen their definition of their common enemy, or develop an identity of shared fate, the road would be paved for the rule of benevolent dictators.

These benevolent rulers in order to avert any possible coups against them will be compelled to sign defensive pacts with fellow African Military leaders. In time, a number of these military pacts will lead to a loose federation of the armed forces of the countries involved, and exchange of personnel. As the interaction amongst members of the armed forces increases, there will follow an increase in their perception of their responsibility to Africa. Dr. Nkrumah was quick to observe that when such a unity becomes apparent,

'our critics are quick to observe an attempt to, impose leadership and to abrogate sovereignty.'⁷

In spite of this, Kwame Nkrumah passionately believed that there was no basis for the security of African States unless African leaders realized beyond all doubts that the salvation of Africa cannot preclude unity. He contended that African countries must unite or sell themselves to imperialists and exploiters for a mess of pottage, or disintegrate individually.⁸

If Biafra had survived, Nigeria would have disintegrated further.

The unsuccessful attempts to effects some regional unity such as the ill-fated Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, or the Egypt-Syria Union, or the Senegal-Gambia Union does not mean the impossibility of regional unity in Africa. It was a laudable attempt to begin somewhere to establish the much needed larger regrouping of many mushroom countries created out of the dust of colonial struggles in Africa. A number of reasons could be adduced for the failure of these

7. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite. London; Heinemann, 1963, p. 217.

8. Ibid, p. 145

countries to achieve lasting unions. It is my contention, however, that these failures notwithstanding, the fusion of the military elites of two or more countries in order to protect their common interests will in time extend to other countries. Such a fusion will come about by decrees after preliminary discussions at top military levels.

I am aware that many skeptics will frown at this trend of argument, but as Herbert J. Spiro⁹ points out, ‘controversy in a field of study is generally a sign of youth and vigour,’ and should be welcome. The primary inducement for this view is the established fact that the military has come to stay in Africa. Any politician that piously expects that the military would willingly hand over power to the civilians may be living in a fool’s paradise. The re-intervention of the military of Ghana, or the Togo and Dahomean experiences are pointers to a pattern. Transition from the military to civilian rule has always been welcomed by rapacious politicians who have been waiting quite impatiently for the exit of the soldier. The current aspirations of Nigerians carried in Nigerian Newspapers, all hoping that the military men would honour their pledge to hand over power to the civilians in 1976, may be like the waiting for the coming of the Lord. The civilians have as yet not been allowed any political forum for discussions and exchange of ideas from which may emerge a workable framework for national stability. After eighty years in power, it is obvious that the soldiers and their civilian advisers have nothing new to offer, and the problems of national unity cannot grow less complex with the growing ineptitude of the military men. As I have shown above, strong personalities may achieve momentary stability, but are incapable of producing institutions that can usher in permanent stability.

It is therefore my view, that the military haven struck, the road the participatory democracy seems to have struck a blind alley. During the 1960s, there was the political wind of change in Africa, and many African countries were celebrating the exit of the colonial governors. Hardly were the tables cleared when mortars sounded, and the bombs exploded. In the 1960s, the debate was on the primacy of politics. With the Africa countries suffering from a plethora of

9. Herbert J. Spiro (ed)., Africa: The Primacy of Politics,
New York: Random House, 1966, p. 5

military interventions, and the incursion of corruption into military ethos, I am now raising the controversy of the PRIMACY OF THE MILITARY in quest of African Unity.

An examination of military interventions in table 1 shows that it is a pattern. The Spearman's rank correlation was calculated for table 5 and 6. There is a positive correlation between defence budget and military intervention. $r_s = .51$. One could have concluded that the larger the defence budget, the greater the probability of military intervention. But a closer analysis of the countries shows that defence budgets generally rise after military interventions. The correlation between size of population and military intervention is $-.61$. Thus population is not an explanatory factor. But national income seems to generate a rising tide of expectation of changes in the patterns of living, and military interventions have occurred on the threshold of the transition from colonial poverty to post independence economic boom.

With the exception of Swaziland and Gambia, every independent Africa country has experienced one military 'quake' or another. These exceptions would tend to water down the force of our argument. But the Togo and the Dahomean experiences show that the size of the population is not a sufficient explanation of military intervention. If anything, a composite hypothesis that the smaller the country in proportion to its armed forces, the greater the probability of military intervention would be more plausible.

OBSTACLES TO AFRICAN MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

In spite of the convincing rationale for the integration of the Africa military units, an analysis of probable obstacles is pertinent. These obstacles are both psychological and social. The psychological variables relate to individual motivations and individual circumstances leading to military take-over in various countries. We will also examine the love of power, and the probability of an individual relinquishing power once entrenched.

On the social level, we will analyse group involvement and disturbances of both domestic and foreign commitment. Domestic commitment refers to the patterns of alliance that made it possible for the soldiers to take over power; foreign commitment refers to attachment of various Africa countries to external sources of funds. We will examine some external military aid to Africa countries to show that in spite of the inconsequential nature of these aids, African countries will not only be reluctant to pull their forces together, but will have a lot of pressures exerted on them such that their concerted national consciousness will be watered down to hypocritical motions and resolutions.

A study of the various military interventions in Africa reveals that the principal architects are the members of the opposition in countries that still enjoy civilian exploitation of the masses. In countries under military regime, intervention is fanned by some radical elements within the Armed Forces, or some disgruntled members who feels that they have not had a fair deal in the sharing of booties of their intervention. In many cases, it is a combination of both the radical elements within the Armed Forces and some member of the opposition. In some, for example, in Uganda, an intervention has been triggered by some members of the ruling group. Generally, a disagreement within the ruling group may lead to a coup of consolidation in which the Head of Government is accused of a number of things to justify his overthrow. His erstwhile chief lieutenant steps in to seize power.

It is not correct to argue like some theorists of evolution, that internal disequilibrium is self-generating in a dialectical format of thesis-anti-thesis. Even when we concede the factors of internal forces, it must be admitted that there is hardly a coup in Africa without foreign interest at work. (Ijomah, 1973) has shown with figures, the impact of foreign aid on developing nations. The impact of foreign aid is not less significant on the military. Below are presented three tables showing the extent to which some African military establishments are dependent on foreign aids. These tables are by no means exhaustive, but should reflect the vulnerability of African Armed Forces to external influences. For a

closer study of the impact of the military on developing nations, students should read Jacob Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968. Table 8 of the present paper gives the U.S.A military Aid Programmes from 1950 to 1965. It would be seen that America spends more than 58% of its military aid of Africa in Ethiopia. Of course this is understandable in view of America's large military base in Ethiopia. It is not surprising therefore that many African scholars speculate not without some justification that America is not unconnected with the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie. America's proposed military Aid for the fiscal year 1976 shows (see table 9), that only 3.1% of America's military aid was proposed for Africa; 37.7% for the Far East, and 23.4% for the Near East and South Asia. As in all other aids, Africa again has the crumbs from the master's table. Yet, in spite of this pittance of aid, African countries appear perpetually tied to the apron strings of Washington. When for instance Ethiopia has a defence budget of \$17.7 million dollars, and is promised America aid of 80.9 million dollars, one wonders what type of independence Ethiopian armed forces would have from America. Liberia has a military budget of \$3.1 million, and is promised a defence aid of \$3.1 million dollars. Table 7 gives a sample of French Military Assistance to ex-French colonies in Africa. Of course, as pointed out, (Ijomah, 1973), military aids are not, like other foreign aids aimed at assisting developing countries to effectively defend themselves. Aid is given only to those countries where the donor had some vital interests. The case of Ethiopia is typical of America aid policies. Kaplan (1968:207) contends that the staff of the military and economic aid missions 'must seek accommodation from public and private groups at home andthey must try to moderate demands and attitudes in the aided country while engendering a responsiveness to U.S interests. 'He goes further to argue that "the allocation of defence support and military assistance among developing nations has borne little relation to the relative usefulness of their military forces."¹⁰ Ijomah (1972) also pointed out that ex-colonial countries have contributed more than any single factor to the establishment of ceremonial and under utilized armed forces. Thus, the ex-colonial army occupied a structure

10. Jacob Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid, New York: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, 1968, p. 252

within the society without performing functions that could justify the large expenditure on it. This status of under-employment has created the leisurely atmosphere in which the soldiers find time to become pre-occupied with the domestic politics of their respective countries.

The basic contention here is that as long as African countries depend on foreign nations for the up-keep of their armed forces, their existence would continue to preclude an ideological orientation that would make the creation of a continental armed forces a desired goal. Pressures from foreign donors who would like to see the unity of Africa remain a political mirage would always harp on the abrogation of sovereignty by the mushroom states if they should opt for an integrated military force for Africa. Certainly such pressures do not emanate from the overt concern about the actual security of the Africa countries. They emanate from the concern of the donor countries about their individual investments. Military aid, like economic aid, is not motivated by the interests of the donor, and it is certainly not in the best interest of Foreign Powers for Africa to unite. The balkanization of Africa is a strategy to which the Western Powers are committed. It would be fool-hardy for African countries to believe that the so-called technical advisers would be altruistic in their military advice.

The ultimate contention of the paper is that Nkrumah's call for the need for a unified economic planning, and the need for a unified foreign policy and diplomacy must follow that unification of the bases of power and authority. Nkrumah had wanted the political kingdom as a prelude to economic and military integration. With the present trend in Africa, it is contested that civilian politics in Africa cannot improve on the Latin America pattern unless the powers of the micro-military units in the various countries are limited to those of maintaining peace in local affairs. If the present Heads of African States become regional Governors of their respective countries, it would then be the responsibility of the continental government to ensure that the continental armed forces can be drafted from one country to another to arrest any emergency which under our present circumstances would lead to a coup.

The writer is adopting this rather radical view because of the obvious disruptive effects of military interventions in various countries which not only impede economic progress but prevent the development of national goals. Every coup leader discredits his predecessor. He spends the first three years trying to learn what his predecessor was doing fairly well; the next two or three years are spent amassing wealth; the remaining years are years of uncertainty. After six years in office, the coup leader if he is lucky to survive six years has nothing more to offer. People get impatient and critical, and naturally debate on whether a return to the 'status quo ante' would not be more salubrious. Witch hunting of course would follow, critics are detained in the name of state security, and of course the intellectuals that had hitherto flocked to the new regime would begin to flee. It has been pointed out that when the intellectuals, no matter how dishonest they may be, being their flight from ruling regime, the stage is set for national holocaust.

ARGUMENT FOR THE GRADUAL FUSION OF COUNTRIES:

It has been shown by U.N and F.A.O reports that Africa supplies more than 66% of the world cocoa, 58% of sisal, 65% palm oil, 26% groundnuts, 14% coffee, 11% olive oil; 96% of world diamonds excluding the U.S.S.R.; 69% of cobalt; 63% gold, 48% antimony 37% manganese, 34% chromite, 32% phosphate rock, 24% copper, 19% asbestos, 15% tin, 4% iron ore, and 4% buxite. Nigeria alone produce 85% of the world's supply of columbite, while Ghana is the second largest producer of manganese.¹¹ in spite of these rich mineral deposits, Africa remain tied by the strings of European economic exploitation. An analysis of Colin Legum's Africa Contemporary Record shows the direction of Africa Trades to be towards Europe or the United States of America. Trade contacts among Africa countries are so deplorable that any attempt to compare the figures with those of Europe leaves one writhing in disgust. For instance, the proportion of Ivory Coast import from Algeria for the year 1968 to that of France was .0247, while what the U.A.R. imported from Lybia in 1968 was .0008 of what West

11. Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, London; Heinemaa, 1963, pp. 150 – 151

Germany imported from Lybia in the same period. Algerian import from Morocco for the same period was .0335 of what France imported from Morocco during the same period. The point that is being made is that the African continent must now devise a political formula that will increase internal inter-dependence among Africa countries and minimize external dependence. Of course, as long as individual African countries are free to negotiate loans and trade agreements with foreign countries, this tendency to rely on foreign countries would continue. Before the military coups in Nigeria, all the Regions of the country had foreign representation, and dealings with foreign countries became a source of competition among the various Nigerian Regional Governments. Fortunately, the Ironsi regime was wise to close those Regional High Commissions, and gave Nigeria a Unified Embassy. By extension, there are many areas in our foreign relations in which Africa can speak with one voice. There is no reason for instance why Gambia or Lesotho or Gabon for that matter should waste development money for luxurious embassies in London, Paris or Washington. A continental Government could easily cater for the needs of these countries in terms of foreign policy and diplomacy. What is most imperative as a stepping stone is a unified policy making body. With the military presence in African politics, a unified military can usher in unity in various other phases. Exploitation of Africa's mineral resources would now become the responsibility of a joint planning body; this in effect, would end the exploitation of the mineral resources of the smaller African countries whose only justification for existing as a country is the fact of their creation by the colonial exploiter.

Having given foregoing argument, one would like to contend that the unification of the African military cannot be achieved by any magic wand, nor will it come all that smoothly. Without taking the readers very far, Kwame Nkrumah has ably demonstrated that the unification of Africa cannot be regarded as novelty because history abounds with cases of successful unifications. The emergence of the U.S.S.R. as a world power began with four original republics.

Today, it has sixteen sovereign republics and many autonomous regions, but all wielded together by a common constitution and a National Government.

The phenomenal rise of America people from the union of original thirteen states to fifty states is another interesting case, neither can we forget the growth of Canada, and its subsequent unification. In spite of the staggering cultural, economic and political difference in these unions, it is interesting to note that today they dominate the world. It is however true that at the time the unification these states was possible, foreign interference was not as determined as it is in the case of the Africa countries. That is why the African Governments must be alive to their inhibitors, no matter how benevolent their gifts are. They should not sway Africa from the inevitable path to unity which alone is the road to the salvation of Africa, and the possibility of its ever rising as a world power. Africa should learn from the experiences of history.

WHAT THE O.A.U CAN CONTRIBUTE

The need to end the coups and military interventions in Africa is imperative even at the risk of the High Command getting involved to ensure that peace and tranquility are maintained. Peace and stability are vital for economic, cultural and social development of African countries. That is why the O.A.U, must devise means of using a continental army to ensure stability in various countries.

While it is true that the public contempt in many Africa countries, it is still my contention that the solution of African problems demands more radical approach than the toothless diplomatic maneuvers of civilian governments. The emasculation of Malawi by the South Africa Republic, or the garrisoned state of Lesotho to mention but a few, have no more moral suession on South Africa than the African Blacks have employed. Yet, the fate of racism in South Africa remains as healthy as every before. That the Apartheid has survived thus far in South African cannot be attributed to the superiority of the South African Government. Rather, it is because African Governments have shown that they incapable of offending the sensitivities of their benefactors.

It becomes therefore imperative that the O.A.U. should now reconsider the individual roles of its members in their relationship with South Africa and Rhodesia. Some of these countries quite rightly cannot afford to offend South Africa. But with strong assurance and backing from a United Military Command, there is no doubt that countries like Malawi, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland would assume more "Africa postures" than they can afford at the moment.

A recourse to the African military is a recognition of the already eroded military and professional ethos by the acquired arrogance and commercialism that ruin civilian administrations. As pointed out, everywhere, the military men who were once despised for their poverty and uncouth way of life have discovered that it is after all easier to make money and improve their material conditions of life by intervening in politics. From a strictly professional point of view, military services were opposed to the accumulation of wealth. But in a continent flooded with military but unwarlike people, the necessity to abide by the military professional ethics was not there. People now join the armed forces with the clear-cut expectation of wresting power someday. As long as the military profession continues to be commercialized, so long will the enlisted officers look forward to politicised roles, and so long will the military might of the African countries be individually enervated. It is therefore for this reason that one makes bold to call for a more functional role of the members of the armed forces. An increase in the interdependence of the armed forces of various African countries, will minimize individual ambitions of the soldiers, and highlight the needs of the countries. Moreover, when the armed forces of various African countries come under a High Military Command, the micro-interests of the mushroom countries will for some time be dominated by a transcendental concern for the continent. This in effect, will reduce the countries to the status of States functioning within a continental government.

CONCLUSION

Briefly put, the emergence of a continental government for Africa cannot arise out of the wishful aspirations of the hypocritical vote catchers. It must arise out of a felt need for greater continental security. A unification of the armed forces will of course call for a unified economic planning for the continent. The increased economic interdependence of African countries will hasten the tempo of development in the communications systems, and call for a closer front in international and diplomatic relations with non-African countries. When the responsibility for the security of the African continent is centralised, there will be greater introspection. That is, the African countries will now find time to look inwards for bases of self-development rather than the uneasy reliance of foreign aids which as (Ijomah, 1973) points out, creates a perpetuated sense of dependence.

At present, the influence of the military men in the Organization of African Unity cannot be under-estimated. It is projected that as the military men assume political roles in all African countries, the need for internal security of these political roles would call for alliances no matter how fragile and loose they might be at the on-set. But like the creation of other States such as Canada, the United States of America, or even the fusion of some other smaller units into larger wholes, the fusion of African States give the continued threats of neo-colonialist interests in Africa will be a matter of time.

TABLE 1
MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

S/N	COUNTRY	YEAR OF INDEPENDENCE	REVOLT RIOTS STRIKES DEMONSTRATIONS	ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION	ASSASSINATION	ATTEMPTED COUPS	SUCCESSFUL COUPS	CIVIL WAR TRIBAL WAR	SCORE
1.	Algeria	July 3, 1962			Khemisti, April, 12, 1963	Dec.14, 1967	June 19, '65 Bella Ousted	Berber revolt Oct. 8, 1963	18
2.	Botswana	Sept. 30, 1966		Nov, ' 67					2
3.	Burundi	July, 1, 1962			Primier Ngendandum, Jan. 16, 1965	Oct. 19, 1976	Nov. 28, 1966		12
4.	Cameroon	Jan. 1, 1960				Dec. 30, '59 – Jan. 2, 1960		From 1960 – 1964	14
5.	Central Africa Republic	Aug. 13, 1960					Jan. 1, 1966		5
6.	Republic of Chad	Aug. 11, 1960				Oct. 4, '61 Aug. ' 71			8
7.	Congo Brazaville	Aug. 15, 1969	Strike ' 63, Riots Aug. 15, '64 Riots July 18-27, '65 Riots June 27, 1967			Jan. 10, 1966 May 13, 1968 July 31, 1968	Aug. 14, 1963 Oct. 2, 1968		26
8.	Congo Kinshasa	June 30, 1960	1970		Feb. 13, 1961	July, 9, 1960 July 7, 1964 Aug., 1964 Mercenaries 1967	Sept. 15, 1960, Nov. 25	Jan – Feb ' 61 Jan., 1962 Sept., 2 ' 60	48
9.	Dahomey	Aug. 1, 1960	Dec., 1960 Oct. 3-6 1966			May 30, 1961	Oct. 28, '63 Dec. 22, '65 Dec. 27, '67 Dec., 1969 Oct. 26, '72		31

10.	Ethiopia	Never a Colony Except for '35- '41	1973 1974			Dec. 15-17, 1960 Nov., 1966	1916 Sept. 12, 1974		15
11.	Gabon	Aug. 17, 1960					Feb. 19, 1964		5
12.	Gambia	Feb. 18, 1965							0
13.	Ghana	March 6, 1957	1957, ' 58 1959, '61 Nov. 7. '61	1958, 1959 Aug., 1962 1964, Jan. 3		April, 17, 1967, Nov. 28, 1968	Feb. 24, 1966 Jan. 13, 1972		31
14.	Guinea	Oct. 2, 1958				Dec. 22, '61 Nov. 11, '65 Nov. -Dec. '70			12
15.	Ivory Coast	Aug. 7, 1960				1962; Jan., 1963			8
16.	Kenya	Dec., 12, 1963	April 28, 1966 Jan., 1964			1965	1964 Tribal		12
17.	Lesotho	Sept. 30, 1960	Riots 1966						1
18.	Liberia	July 26, 1947	Sept. 13, 1961	June 24, '55 1961, Feb. 5 1963		August, 1958			7 2
19.	Libya	Jan. 2, 1952	Feb., 1952, March 21, 1959, Jan., 26, 1964, May ' 65		Oct. 6, 1954	1958, July, 20	Sept. 1, 1969		16
20.	Malagasy	March 26, 1960	1972						2
21.	Malawi	July 6, 1964	Sept. 30, 1960 Feb. 13, 1965 Oct. 30, '66						3
22.	Mail	July 20, 1960	Dec., 1963			Oct. 2, 1962	Nov. 19, 1968		10
23.	Mauritania	Nov. 28, 1960				Aug. 15, '63			4
24.	Morocco	March 2, 1956 From France; April 7, 1956 From Spain	Riots ' 58 Revolt '62 Riots ' 65			June, 1963 July, 1971		1959	21

*The recent September 12, 1974 coups in Ethiopia has not been added to the score.

25.	Niger	Aug. 3, 1960		April 14, 1965		Dec. 2, 1963 Oct. 15, '64			10
26.	Nigeria	Oct. 1, '160	Riots '64 Ethnic Clashes 1964, Demon. 1964; Rioting 1965			1962	Jan. 15, 1966 July 29, 1966	1967 – 1970	25
27.	Rwanda	July 1, 1962	July, '62				July 5, 1973	1964	12
28.	Senegal	June 20, 1960	1963	1967		1961, 1962			11
29.	Sierra Leone	April 17, 1961	July, 1963 Strike, 1968 Demon.	2 time in 1971		March, 1971	March, '67 April 8, 1968		20
30.	Somalia	July 1, 1960	July 2, 1960			Dec. 10, 1961 1963	Oct., 1969	Tribal Clashes 1962	
31.	Sudan	Jan. 1, 1956	1960 1964			1957, May 1959 July 1965, 1966	1958; 1969	1964 Racial War	34
32.	Swaziland	Sept., 1968							0
33.	Tanzania	April 26, 1961				1964, Jan			4
34.	Togo	April 27, 1960		1961, 1962, 1967	Jan. 13, 1963	April 10, 1963 Nov. 10, 1966	Jan. 13, '63 Jan. 13, 1967		27
35.	Tunisia	March 20, 1975	Dec., 1966			Dec., 24 1962			5
36.	Uganda	Oct. 9, 1962	Ethnic Violence 1963 Riots 1966				Jan. 25, 1971		7
37.	Egypt	1922		1965		1953, 1954 1965, 1966	July 23, 1952		23
38.	Upper Volta	August 5, 1960				1967	Jan. 3, 1966		9
39.	Zambia	Oct. 24, 1964	Riots 1968						1

To arrive at the scores, the following procedure was used: Various events in which the military had to intervene were identified and rank-ordered from 1 to 7. Thus, political rioting, strikes, student demonstrations etc, were given a score 1 since military intervention is minimal, and depended on the orders of the civilian government. Attempted Assassination was given a score of 2; successful assassination 3; attempted coup 4; coup 5; tribal/religious warfare 6 and civil war 7. The scores were given for each occurrence, and the total for each country was then taken on all items identified for each country since the attainment of independence.

TABLE 2
AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION AS INDEX OF INSTABILITY
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BY AREA BLOCKS

<u>Block 1</u>	<u>Block 2</u>	<u>Block 3</u>	<u>Block 4</u>
18	2	14	1
15	12	8	12
16	5	31	25
4	26	31	4
21	48	12	7
34	5	8	<u>49</u>
5	1	7	
23	3	10	
<u>136</u>	12	10	
	0	25	
	1	11	
	<u>115</u>	20	
		27	
		<u>9</u>	
		223	

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY
TABLE

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	MS	F	F. OS
Total Sum of Squares	4910.67	38			
Between Groups	262.21	3	87.40	.66	2.8
Within Groups	4648.46	35	132.81		

F is not significant at .05 with 3 and 35 degrees of Freedom.

The independent African Countries minus Guinea-Bissau were divided into four area blocks:

Block 1 is designated Northern Block and includes Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.

Block 2 is designated the Central Block, and includes Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic Congo Brazzaville, Zaire, Gabon Lesotho, Malawi, Rwanda, Swaziland and Zambia.

Block 3 is designated Western Block, and includes Cameroon, Republic of Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta.

Block 4 is designated Eastern Block, and includes Malagasy, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania and Uganda.

TABLE 3
AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION SCORES AS AN INDEX OF
INSTABILITY

	<u>Group A</u>	<u>Group B</u>
	2	28
	14	12
	5	48
	8	15
	26	0
	31	12
	5	31
	8	7
	12	3
	1	4
	16	10
	1	25
	21	12
	20	11
	34	25
	0	4
	5	7
	9	23
	10	27
	1	
Total	<u>229</u>	<u>304</u>

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY TABLE

Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	DF	MS	F	F. O5
Total Sum of Squares	4910.67	38	201.72		
Between Groups	201.27	1	201.72	1.58	4.1
Within Groups	4708.95	37	127.27		

F is not significant at .05 level with 1 and 37 df. It is concluded that military intervention is a general phenomenon in Africa.

TABLE 4
AFRICAN MILITARY SITUATION

S/N	Country	Countries' Population	Armed Forces Including Police, Gendarmerie National Guard and para Military	Proportion of total population	Budget in Dollars	1969/74 Defence Budget in Dollars	Proportion of National Budget
1.	Algeria	12,943,000	100,000	.008	1,568,825,911	99,190,283	0.6
2.	Botswana	648,000	1,000	.002	26,570,000	1,418,547	.053
3.	Burundi	3,406,000	1,900	.0006	23,880,597	3,444,317	.144
4.	Cameroon	5,562,000	11,350	.002	138,638,819	27,727,764	.20
5.	Central African Republic	1,488,000	3,100	.002	45,153,043	4,054,735	.10
6.	Republic of Chad	4,100,000	6,300	.002	55,311,487	5,835,000	.11
7.	Congo Brazaville	870,000	4,500	.005	70,219,662	3,785,000	.05
8.	Zaire	21,637,876	80,000	.004	56,949,408	5,400,000	.10
9.	Dahomey	2,800,000	4,250	.002	38,181,491	3,957,508	.10
10.	Ethiopia	23,900,000	81,400	.003	125,844,660	17,450,486	.04
11.	Gabon	350,000	2,860	.008	72,020,166	4,250,000	.06
12.	Gambia	350,000	560	.002	9,611,292	-	-
13.	Ghana	8,500,000	37,900	.005	371,043,478	42,608,696	.12
14.	Guinea	3,795,000	8,900	.002	92,910,569	5,870,000	.06
15.	Ivory Coast	4,690,000	7,050	.002	254,000,405	16,609	.0001

16.	Kenya	10,942,705	16,900	.002	223,064,310	18,550,725	.08
17.	Lesotho	970,000	1,500	.002	36,775,302	1,949,091	.05
18.	Liberia	1,500,000	10,900	.007	62,200,000	3,100,000	.05
19.	Libya	1,875,000	15,600	.008	511,560,000	84,000,000	.16
20.	Malagasi	6,500,000	11,000	.002	155,884,048	12,423,479	.08
21.	Malawi	4,285,000	4,150	.001	26,256,000	1,312,800	.05
22.	Mali	4,800,000	6,150	.001	41,108,893	10,300,000	.25
23.	Mauritania	1,120,000	2,130	.002	22,671,948	4,332,013	.19
24.	Morocco	15,379,259	50,000	.003	903,069,281	79,411,765	.09
25.	Niger	4,500,000	5,650	.001	39,270,000	3,650,000	.19
26.	Nigeria	62,650,000	280,000	.005	2,350,470,000	326,000,000	.14
27.	Rwanda	3,500,000	3,950	.001	61,200,000	3,210,000	.05
28.	Senegal	3,900,000	10,700	.003	168,887,288	21,050,000	.13
29.	Sierra Leone	3,000,000	3,700	.001	45,000,000	1,000,000	.02
30.	Somalia	2,745,000	18,500	.007	47,142,857	6,670,000	.14
31.	Sudan	15,000,000	36,950	.003	442,445,808	40,000,000	.09
32.	Swaziland	500,000	700	.002	7,000,000	1,260,000	.18
33.	Tanzania	13,000,000	16,400	.001	229,659,511	7,225,000	.03

34.	Togo	1,772,000	2,600	.002	35,700,000	2,757,000	.08
35.	Tunisia	4,660,000	30,550	.007	292,600,000	16,630,000	.06
36.	Uganda	8,133,000	13,700	.002	212,812,500	17,025,000	.08
37.	Egypt (U.A.R)	33,329,000	282,000	.009	8,577,030,000	480,000,000	.06
38.	Upper Volta	5,155,000	4,450	.001	37,865,322	2,819,000	.07
39.	Zambia	4,057,000	10,650	.00	467,600,000	20,055,000	.04
Total		308,312,840	1,189,950		16,537,490,736	1,389,639,818	.085

TABLE 5
CORRELATION BETWEEN POPULATION RANK AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

Country	Military Intervention Rank	Population Rank	d	d²
Algeria	28	32	-4	16
Botswana	6	4	2	4
Burundi	22.5	16	6.5	42.25
Cameroon	25	27	-2	4
Central African Republic	11	8	3	9
Republic of Chad	15.5	19	-4.5	20.25
Congo Brazzaville	34	5	29	841
Congo Kinshasa	39	36	3	9
Dahomey	36.5	13	23.5	552.3
Ethiopia	26	37	-11	121
Gabon	1.5	1	0.5	0.25
Gambia	11	2	-9	81
Ghana	36.5	30	6.5	42.25
Guinea	22.5	17	5.5	30.25
Ivory Coast	15.5	21	-5.5	30.25
Kenya	22.5	31	-8.5	72.25
Lesotho	4	6	-2	4
Liberia	13.5	9	4.5	20.25
Libya	27	10	17	289
Malagasy	4	28	-24	576
Malawi	7	22	-15	225
Mali	18.5	25	-6.5	42.25
Mauritania	4	7	-3	9
Morocco	30	35	-5	25
Niger	18.5	23	-4.5	20.25
Nigeria	35.5	39	-6.5	42.25
Rwanda	22.5	15	7.5	56.25
Senegal	20	18	2	4
Sierra Leone	29	14	15	225
Somalia	32.5	12	20.5	420.3

Sudan	38	34	4	16
Swaziland	1.5	3	-1.5	225
Tanzania	8.5	33	-24.5	600.3
Togo	35	11	24	576
Tunisia	11	24	-13	169
Uganda	13.5	29	-15.5	240.3
Egypt (U.A.R)	31	38	-7	49
Upper Volta	17	26	-9	81
Zambia	4	20	-16	256
			$\Sigma d^2 = 6046.20$	

$$\gamma^2 = 1 - \frac{6 \Sigma d^2}{N^3 - N}$$

Where N = 39

$$\gamma_s = -0.61$$

TABLE 6

Country	Rank on Military Intervention	Rank on Defence Budget	d	d²
Algeria	28	38	-10	100
Botswana	6	3	3	9
Burundi	22.5	4	18.5	342.25
Cameroon	25	29	-4	16
Central African Republic	11	8	3	9
Republic of Chad	15.5	18	-2.5	6.5
Congo Brazzaville	34	15	19	361
Congo Kinshasa	39	32	7	49
Dahomey	36.5	16	20.5	420.25
Ethiopia	26	33	-7	49
Gabon	11	9	2	4
Gambia	1.5	1	.5	.25
Ghana	36.5	35	1.5	2.25
Guinea	22.5	19	3.5	12.25
Ivory Coast	15.5	23.5	-8	64
Kenya	22.5	26	-3.5	12.25
Lesotho	4	7	-3	9
Liberia	13.5	13	.5	.25
Libya	27	28	-1	1
Malagasy	4	25	-21	441
Malawi	7	6	1	1
Mali	18.5	23.5	-5	25
Mauritania	8.5	17	-8.5	72.25
Morocco	30	37	-7	49
Niger	18.5	14	4.5	20.25
Nigeria	32.5	36	-3.5	12.25
Rwanda	22.5	5	17.5	306.25
Senegal	20	31	-11	121
Sierra Leone	29	10	19	361
Somalia	32.5	20	12.5	156.25
Sudan	38	34	4	16
Swaziland	1.5	2	.5	.25

Tanzania	8.5	21	-12.50	156.25
Togo	35	11	24	576
Tunisia	11	22	-11	121
Uganda	13.5	30	-16.50	272.25
Egypt (U.A.R)	31	39	-8	64
Upper Volta	17	12	5	25
Zambia	4	27	-23	529
			Σd^2	4792.25

$$\gamma^2 = 1 - \frac{6 \Sigma d^2}{N^3 - N}$$

$$\gamma_s = .51$$

TABLE 7
FRENCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE (EXCLUDING GIFTS OF
EQUIPMENT) IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

					<u>1964</u>
Cameroon	1.84
Central Africa Republic		1.40
Chad	1.36
Dahomey	2.00**
Gabon88
Ivory Coast	2.00
Malagasy	11.66
Mauritania	1.30
Niger	1.00
Senegal	1.40
				Total	<u>24.84</u>

** French gift of military vehicles was worth \$2.00 million.

Source: M.J.V. Bell, Military Assistance to Africa,
 ("Adelphi Papers, "No. 15, Dec., 1964, 155)
 cited in Henry Bienen op. cit, p. 101.

Note: Bell gave the total military assistance of Africa as \$48.4 millions

TABLE 8**U.S.A AID TO AFRICAN****MILITARY GRANT AID PROGRAMMES CHARGEABLE TO
APPROPRIATIONS DELIVERS 1950 – 1956 IN MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS**

Cameroon2
Congo Kinshana (Zaire)	7.4
Dahomey1
Ethiopia	80.9
Ghana	0.5
Guinea	0.5
Ivory Coast1
Liberia	3.1
Libya	8.1
Mali	1.6
Morocco	18.4
Niger1
Nigeria5
Senegal	2.5
Sudan1
Tunisia	15.1
Upper Volta	1.0
							Total	138.00

Source: Henry Bienen, “Foreign Policy, The Military and Development: Military Assistance and Political Change in Africa, “in Richard Butwell (ed.)
Foreign Policy and Developing Nation; Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1969.

TABLE 9**FISCAL YEAR, 1967****PROPOSED U.S MILITARY AID IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS**

					<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Europe	36,129	3.5
Near East and South Asia				..	240,125	23.4
Africa	31,816	3.1
Far East	387,340	37.7
Latin America	71,999	7.0
Regional Costs	68,991	6.7
Worldwide Costs	<u>190,600</u>	<u>18.6</u>
				Total	<u><u>1,027,000</u></u>	<u><u>100.00</u></u>

Source: Military Assistance Facts 2, cited in Henry Bienen, op. cit., p. 103

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